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Abstract  
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apply an alternative method that allows us to estimate renters' marginal willingness to pay for 
apartment characteristics based on residential mobility. We focus on the households' marginal 
willingness to pay for quality of apartments. We find that, on average, households place a monetary 
value on quality which is close to the non-profit housing associations' costs of providing quality. 
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1. Introduction 
In the current paper, we introduce, and apply, a dynamic search approach methodology to 
estimate the value of housing attributes to households in the public housing sector. In many 
large US and European cities, non-profit associations cover a large proportion of rental 
housing stock, usually labelled as ‘public housing’ in the US or as ‘social housing’ in Europe. 
It is estimated that about 46% of the rental market in the European Union (EU) is provided by 
non-profit associations. In the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, and England, public housing is 
the dominant rental market form (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2007). In these countries, public 
housing is frequently similar to its form in the US in its earliest decades which focused on 
working class households. Empirical economic research on non-profit associations in the 
public housing market is absent despite its importance. 
We consider the dynamic search approach as a suitable alternative to the standard 
static approach, which relies on estimation of hedonic price functions (see, e.g., Sheppard, 
1999), and which may not be applied to the public housing sector where rents are either 
controlled or implicitly subsidised. This is an important restriction, because hedonic price 
estimates have been used on a large scale to estimate the value of non-market (dis)amenities 
such as pollution, parks etc, but these estimates do not apply to the households of public 
housing so the more disadvantaged households in society in which policymakers are 
particularly interested.  
We focus on the Netherlands where about 85% of the rental units are supplied by a 
non-profit organisation (VROM, 2004). Large parts of the population live their whole lives in 
public housing. The large majority of public housing rental units are apartments, so, in the 
remainder of this study, we will refer to apartments.  
One of the disadvantages of public housing – and housing market regulation, in 
general – is that housing suppliers' decisions, regarding the supply of rental quality, are 
distorted. For example, it is generally believed that private suppliers will under-invest in 
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maintenance when faced with rent control. However, theoretical studies such as Olsen (1988) 
and Kutty (1996) show that the effect of rent control on rental quality is ambiguous. For 
example, Olsen (1988) shows that, if rent increases under a controlled regime are tied to 
landlord maintenance, rent control could lead to higher quality. The effect of rent control on 
rental quality has been empirically examined by at least a dozen studies. For reviews, see 
Moon and Stotsky (1993) and Sims (2007). Recent evidence by Sims (2007), which we 
believe is one of the most accurate studies, shows that rent control slightly reduces quality.  
It is, a priori, not clear to what extent this result also hold for non-profit housing 
associations that all operate in a market with rent control and aim to keep rents ‘affordable’. If 
these associations maximise welfare, then these associations will supply quality in accordance 
with the associated costs and the preferences of households and not reduce quality. We 
emphasise that, ceteris paribus, households will prefer higher quality, but since quality 
involves higher costs and higher rents, it is unknown whether non-profit associations under or 
oversupply quality.  
To examine the allocation of rental quality for non-profit housing associations, we 
estimate the rent, costs, as well as the households’ utility of quality (using the dynamic search 
approach) in the public housing sector, and examine whether the estimated households' 
willingness to pay for quality equals the costs of providing quality as one would expect in 
non-regulated markets.  
In our empirical application, we focus on apartments owned by non-profit housing 
associations in Rotterdam, the second largest city of the Netherlands. Rents are controlled at 
the national level by restricting rent levels and by restricting annual increases. Rent levels 
depend on characteristics of the apartments including quality, see VROM (2007). Excess 
demand is dealt with using a queuing system based on the length of their residence duration. 
For most apartments, the waiting time is several years. Households that move into a new 
apartment lose their position in the queue as their residence duration is zero. Households are 
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able to reject as many offers as they like (but are usually not allowed to inspect more than 
three available residences).  
There are two distinctive characteristics of rent control in the Netherlands. First, 
because the controlled maximum rent depends positively on quality, housing associations 
have an incentive to provide quality, as demonstrated by Olsen (1988). Second, in contrast to 
private house suppliers that set the rent to the maximum value determined by rent control 
(Arnott, 1995), housing associations usually set rents slightly below the maximum value set 
by rent control (97% of apartments in our sample), which offers even more freedom to set 
rents which depend on quality.1 One reason why associations do not ask the maximum rent is 
to justify the requirements of national governments, i.e., that they act in the interest of their 
tenants by providing affordable housing. Supply responses will be ignored. This is in line with 
Kangasharju (2008), which shows that public (but not private) housing providers set the rent 
in line with the costs. 
To estimate the household’s willingness to pay for quality, we introduce a dynamic 
search approach methodology for the housing market that employs information on the 
residential mobility of renters. It can be applied to regulated market, for example those with 
rent control and in the public housing sector. This approach acknowledges that in a regulated 
market, households search for apartments. The willingness to pay will be compared with the 
effects of quality on the apartment' rent and costs employing hedonic approaches. 
 
2. Theory 
2.1 Theoretical model of residential moving 
Gronberg and Reed (1994) show for the labour market how a worker's marginal willingness to 
pay (MWP) for job attributes can be derived from job duration data, using a dynamic search 
approach methodology. In their approach, the trade-off between wages and job attributes is 
                                               
1
 The rents do not depend on any characteristics of the renter though, as the rent is announced before 
applicants may apply. The only exception is that high income households pay the maximum rent, 
which we fully capture by a households income indicator. 
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explicitly used. For empirical applications, we refer to, among others, Manning (2003a, 
2003b) and Dale-Olsen (2006). We apply a similar approach to the rent-controlled housing 
market based on residential mobility, but the trade-off between rents and residential 
characteristics (viz quality) is used.2 
Suppose that apartments are completely characterised by a (controlled) rent r and a 
range of residential characteristics (e.g., quality). The residential characteristics are denoted as 
s. Suppose the presence of N residential characteristics, si (i = 1,..,N). Therefore, the 
household enjoys an instantaneous utility of an apartment, equal to u, where u is a concave 
function of the rent r and residential characteristics s. By assumption, the instantaneous utility 
is a negative function of the rent, so u = u(r,s), where ur = ∂u/∂r < 0.  
Hedonic price theory relies on the assumption that house prices are set in a 
competitive market. In a competitive market, house suppliers ask a rent, (implicitly) taking 
into account that households maximise utility, have complete information, and may move 
residence at no costs. Households' maximisation of u over s indicates then that us+(dr/ds)ur = 
0, which implies that dr/ds = -us/ur. Hence, in a competitive market, the marginal willingness 
to pay (MWP) for a residential characteristic, defined by -us/ur, is equal to dr/ds. We will not 
make such an assumption. We will assume that the current rent may be determined arbitrarily 
and renters cannot freely move to other residences. 
We assume that renters search for other (rent-controlled) apartments and receive offers 
of apartments, which arrive at a fixed finite rate λ.3 Renters know the distribution of the utility 
of all other apartments in the market. Given an offer, renters have to immediately accept or 
reject the offer (usually referred to as a sequential search assumption). Thus, renters are not 
                                               
2
 Bartik, Butler, and Liu (1992) derive the value of neighbourhood amenities using information about 
residential moving behaviour, but use a different methodology. 
3
 This assumption, which must be interpreted as a simplification of the housing search process, is in 
line with the institutional setting of the regulated rental market in Rotterdam, where most apartments 
are allocated based on lotteries or queues. About two thirds of households that hold a residence in the 
public housing sector stay in this sector when moving residence. 
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able to hoard (or recall) offers. Renters will accept an offer for another apartment, with a 
certain probability.  
The assumptions regarding search technology seem to hold much better in the 
regulated rental market than in the labour market. For example, in the labour market, hoarding 
of multiple job offers (as well as recall) is not uncommon. In the regulated rental market, 
offers must be accepted upon inspection of the property. Hence, the sequential search 
assumption (which is strongly debated in the labour market literature) may hold almost 
literally in the regulated rental market. Let γ denote the probability of acceptance. Renters will 
accept the offer if the utility associated with the offered apartment exceeds the level of the 
utility of the current apartment (taking future offers into account). This implies that the 
probability of acceptance will depend negatively on the utility of the current unit, so γ = γ(u), 
where ∂γ/∂u < 0. 
The exit rate, the rate at which the renter voluntarily leaves the current apartment, is 
denoted as θ. So, θ = λγ(u). We are particularly interested in the relationship between the ratio 
of the derivatives of the exit rate θ with respect to r and s, and the ratio of the derivatives of 
the instantaneous utility function with respect to r and s, which determines the negative of the 
marginal willingness to pay for characteristic si. Differentiation of θ as a function of si and r, 
shows that these ratios are equal to each other: 
 
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
i i
u r s r s
s s
u r s r s
r r
θ
θ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=∂ ∂
∂ ∂
. (1) 
 
The left-hand side of this expression is the negative of the renter's MWP for a housing 
characteristic si. The right-hand side of the expression is the ratio of the marginal effects of 
characteristic si and rent r on the voluntary exit rate. 
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2.2 Discussion and extensions 
Some of the above assumptions may be restrictive, but they can be relaxed. For example, it 
may be assumed that the arrival rate λ depends positively on the endogenously chosen search 
intensity z, and that the (time) costs of search are a positive convex function of z, which 
additively affects household utility. This extension takes into account that households may 
differ in their search intensity in the rental market. 
Another assumption is that the arrival rate λ is time-varying. This is relevant for rent-
controlled markets, where queuing systems are used to select renters so the offer rate, λ, is 
increasing over queuing time. So, another extensions is that λ = λ(τ), where τ is the time in the 
queue. This is relevant because in Rotterdam, households enter a new queue when they move 
residence, so τ is the elapsed residence duration.4 Another extension is the presence of 
residential moving costs (although for renters the moving cost usually thought to be small). 
Given these three extensions, it can be shown that (1) still holds, see Van Ommeren, Van den 
Berg, and Gorter (2000) for details. 5 
The dynamic search approach to estimate the value of attributes is based on two 
fundamental assumptions. Arguably, both assumptions are more likely to hold in the rent-
controlled public housing market than in the labour market. First, application of the 
methodology in the labour market requires that the wage is set unilaterally by the employer, 
which does not allow for wage bargaining. In contrast, in the rent-controlled housing market, 
bargaining over the rent level is not possible. Second, involuntary residence moving in the 
Dutch rent-controlled market is non-existent as the duration of all rent contracts is infinite. In 
the labour market, involuntary job moving occurs regularly which may be problematic for 
some applications (see Van Ommeren and Hazans, 2008). In addition, heterogeneity in jobs is 
likely much larger than heterogeneity in residences (as jobs rely on social relationships that are unique 
                                               
4
 Hence, in the empirical analyses we will control for the elapsed residence duration. 
5
 Note however that the interpretation of (1) slightly changes when one allows for residential moving 
costs as the MWP is now based on the lifetime utility rather than the instantaneous utility. For the 
current application, this difference has no consequences. 
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in nature, e.g., with colleagues), which makes it much more difficult to apply any ceteris paribus 
condition in the labour market than in the rent-controlled market. 
 
2.3 Welfare analysis 
Welfare analysis of models with search imperfections is non-standard, and has received much 
attention in the theoretical labour market literature (e.g., Hosios, 1990). For the labour market, 
it is generally believed that search imperfections are intrinsic (due to a lack of information 
about other agents in the labour market). This makes welfare analysis not only complicated, 
but also makes it dependent on difficult-to-verify conditions. In the rent-controlled, regulated 
housing-market, welfare analysis is straightforward, because search imperfections are not 
intrinsic, but induced by rent control that creates excess demand, such that queuing systems 
and other non-pricing mechanisms are created. So, the standard equilibrium condition that 
dr/ds = -us/ur = cs applies, where cs denotes the marginal costs of providing residential 
characteristic s. Thus, the marginal rent equals the MWP, as well as the marginal cost of 
characteristic s.  
In a regulated housing market, the above condition may not hold. For example, it may 
be the case that -us/ur ≠ dr/ds = cs. Housing associations will then set marginal rents in 
accordance with marginal costs, but this is not optimal from a welfare perspective, because 
the supply of characteristic s is not consistent with the preferences of households. Another 
relevant example is where -us/ur = cs ≠ dr/ds. Hence, the willingness to pay for a characteristic 
equals the cost of providing that characteristic, but the marginal rents are not equal to the 
marginal costs.   
It is then particularly interesting to focus on the case of a quasi- linear utility function 
where the demand for s is independent of household income. In this case, despite rent control, 
households consume the optimal quantity of residential characteristics s from a welfare 
perspective, although they consume off their demand curve (the households’ welfare is then 
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only affected through a lump-sum transfer induced by the difference between marginal rents 
and marginal costs). 
 
3. Empirical approaches 
3.1 Estimation of marginal willingness to pay 
We aim to estimate (∂θ/∂si)/(∂θ/∂r), that is, the ratio of the marginal effects of characteristic si 
and rent r on the residence exit rate θ. We write θ as a function of observed determinants x, 
where x includes apartment characteristics si such as quality, the level of rent, and control 
variables (e.g., household income, neighbourhood dummies). A common specification, which 
guarantees that θ is positive, is that: 
 
exp( )xθ β′= .          (2) 
 
We will use the logarithm of rent, logr, as a determinant, in x (other functional forms generate 
similar results). Let βi denote the element corresponding to variable xi. So, βlogr denotes the 
coefficient of logr. The MWP for si equals then: 
 
log
i
i
s
r
MWP rββ= − ,         i = 1,..,n. (3) 
 
Hence, to calculate the MWP for apartment characteristics si, it is sufficient to estimate the β’s 
of the exit rate θ.
 
In our application, we employ data regarding the number of annual 
residential exits within a three-year period, so we observe 0, 1, 2, or 3 exits. The appropriate 
stochastic model to use is a count model. In this model, the mean number of exits is captured 
by the parameter θ, where θ is specified as in equation (2). We employ a negative binomial 
regression model, which encompasses the well-known Poisson regression model (Cameron 
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and Trivedi, 1998; Winkelmann, 2003).6 In this model, β has a straightforward interpretation, 
because β = ∂logE(n)/∂x, where E(n) is the expected number of exits. In negative binomial 
models, unobserved heterogeneity is captured by one (positive) parameter α, that allows for 
correlation between units of measurement. In one specification, unobserved apartment 
heterogeneity is accounted for by a parameter labelled α (apartment). In another specification, 
we capture unobserved building heterogeneity by a parameter labelled α (building).
 
 
3.2 Estimation of costs and rents 
The marginal rent of apartment characteristics (e.g. quality) will be derived from a hedonic 
analysis with, as dependent variable, the logarithm of rent, logr. We emphasise that the rent is 
regulated and should therefore not be interpreted as a equilibrium outcome of demand and 
supply. The marginal costs of these characteristics will be derived from a hedonic property 
price analysis, using the logarithm of the apartment's property value as a dependent variable. 
This is a valid approach, because apartments are freely traded in the ownership market. In the 
hedonic analysis of prices and rents, we will account for correlation between the error terms 
of apartments located within the same building.   
 
4. Empirical application 
4.1 The data 
Our analysis is based on information about 9,146 rental units of 1,476 buildings during 2002, 
2003, and 2004, obtained from non-profit housing associations in Rotterdam. For each rental 
unit, we know whether a rental unit has been vacated (at least once) during a certain year. 
When the rental unit is vacated, then this implies that the renter has moved residence.7 The 
                                               
6
 The Poisson regression model is usually too restrictive for count data. For our sample, the Poisson 
regression model generates virtually identical estimates.  
7
 A substantial proportion of renters may not have moved residence, but may have died, as the average 
age of the household head is 55 years. Because death is exogenous, and we control for age, this does 
not affect our estimates. 
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frequency of the number of moves within the three-year period is given in Table 1. We 
observe 1,990 annual moves. The average annual moving rate is 7.1%.8  
 
Table 1. Number of moves, 2002-2004. 
 Number of observations Frequency 
0 7,289 79.7 
1 1,728 18.9 
2    125   1.4 
3       4 0 
Total 9,146 100.0  
 
Household characteristics are observed in 2002 only. We use these characteristics as 
time-invariant household characteristics.9 Households that occupy rental units are usually far 
from representative of the population. This is particularly true for cities where low-income 
households seldomly own apartments and where one has to wait many years before one has 
access to the rent-controlled market, so apartments are usually rented by elderly households. 
In our data, for 99% of households, the age of the household is above 28 years and their gross 
household income is below a government-defined threshold value, which determines whether 
households are categorized as poor (€ 15,725 for single-person households, plus € 1,275 if the 
head's age is below 65, plus € 3,500 for multi-person households). These households belong 
to the poorest 43% of households in Rotterdam. The average rent level is €374 per month. 
The average property price of the apartments they occupy is €116,000. 
In our application, we control for a large number of apartment characteristics. 
Descriptives of the variables can be found in Table A.1 of the Appendix. For example, we 
                                               
8
 This measure slightly underestimates the number of moves, as multiple moves within one year are 
only counted once. Given an average annual moving rate of 7.1%, the annual moving rate is 0.22% 
higher than reported. 
9
 This creates measurement error in 14.2% of the observations. Excluding annual observations of 
rental units after a residential move, and estimating the annual probability of moving, generates almost 
identical results. 
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control for the number of rooms, and the size in square meters. Further, we control for the 
residence duration of the household in 2002, and an indicator of household income. We also 
control for the age of the head-of-household. The effect of age on moving has been identified 
previously in other studies, usually suggesting that moving falls with age (Henley, 1998). In 
our sample, the mean (and the median) age of the household head is about 55 years. We also 
include neighbourhood controls. These neighbourhoods are small and the average distance to 
the centroid of a neighbourhood is less than 400 metres. 
Further, we control for the property price residual from a standard hedonic price 
analysis (see column (2) of Table 3). The property price is based on the tax authorities' 
estimates, and may be interpreted as the market house price.10 The property price residual 
essentially captures unobserved local amenities of the apartment, such as the presence of 
shops, public transport, views, etc. Controlling for these amenities is particularly relevant for 
obtaining non-biased results regarding the effect of the rent, because a higher rent is likely 
associated with unobserved amenities that are positively valued by households. To control for 
the price residual rather than the price itself (which is more common) has no effect on the 
estimated willingness to pay for rental quality, the effect we are most interested in, but 
facilitates interpretation of the effect through unobserved amenities. 
In order to derive the willingness to pay for rental quality, we include the logarithm of 
the monthly rent, in line with equation (3). The level of apartment quality is reported by the 
housing association in terms of discrete levels of maintenance, so we avoid subjective or 
strategic reports on quality by households, which is common in household surveys that 
analyse residential mobility. We distinguish between high-quality, average-quality and low-
quality apartments. About 7% of the apartments are of high quality and 6% are of low quality. 
There is hardly any variation of quality of apartments within the same building (as 
maintenance occurs for the whole building, and not for individual apartments).  
                                               
10
 Arguably, observations of house prices are biased, as the house prices reflect the effect of rent 
control in the neighbourhood.  In the current paper, this issue is accounted for by using neighbourhood 
fixed effects.  
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Table 2. Negative binomial regression of residential moving counts. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
rent level (in log) 4.390 (0.221) 4.412 (0.225) 4.983 (0.227) 
low rental quality 0.352 (0.121) 0.322 (0.119) 0.416 (0.124) 
high rental quality -0.312 (0.131) -0.278 (0.129) -0.458 (0.146) 
residual of log property price -2.100 (0.235) -2.086 (0.229) -2.119 (0.224) 
age -0.068 (0.031)  -0.079 (0.027) 
age2/1000 0.114 (0.492)  0.102 (0.440) 
age3/100,000 0.284 (0.247)  0.288 (0.222) 
log residence duration 0.231 (0.112)  0.250 (0.101) 
log residence duration2 -0.014 (0.015)  -0.014 (0.139) 
high income 0.206 (0.218)  0.127 (0.165) 
apartment without lift (no gr. fl.) 0.352 (0.079) 0.427 (0.079) 0.376 (0.090) 
apartment with lift (no gr. fl.) -0.195 (0.103) -0.195 (0.102) -0.016 (0.110) 
size ≤ 50 1.532 (0.201) 1.628 (0.196) 1.702 (0.187) 
50 < size ≤ 60 0.585 (0.158) 0.627 (0.155) 0.715 (0.149) 
60 < size ≤ 70 0.243 (0.125) 0.251 (0.123) 0.371 (0.119) 
1 room 2.450 (0.282) 2.650 (0.279) 2.849 (0.251) 
2 rooms 1.055 (0.216) 1.065 (0.213) 1.138 (0.200) 
3 rooms 0.800 (0.172) 0.838 (0.170) 0.943 (0.163) 
4 rooms  0.285 (0.143) 0.288 (0.142) 0.397 (0.137) 
construction year ≤ 45 0.699 (0.159) 0.711 (0.158) 0.634 (0.151) 
45 < constr. year ≤ 75 1.417 (0.203) 1.508 (0.200) 1.481 (0.192) 
75 < constr. year ≤ 90 0.329 (0.186) 0.378 (0.183) 0.199 (0.187) 
single family dwelling -0.663 (0.132) -0.674 (0.129) -0.630 (0.132) 
neighbourhood controls (8) yes yes yes 
α x 10-2 (apartment) 0.060 (3.064) 0.064 (2.51) 0 
α (building)  0 0 0.126 (0.030) 
log L -4571.605 -4637.295 -4551.891 
number of observations 9,146 9,146 9,146 
Note: Standard errors between brackets. 
 14 
Table 3. Hedonic price and rent analysis. 
 (1) (2) 
 log rent log price 
low rental quality -0.079 (0.012) -0.028 (0.011) 
high rental quality 0.130 (0.016) 0.103 (0.015) 
apartment without lift (no gr. fl.) -0.053 (0.004) -0.087 (0.004) 
apartment with lift (no gr. fl.) 0.008 (0.009) 0.004 (0.008) 
size ≤ 50 -0.256 (0.011) -0.259 (0.010) 
50 < size ≤ 60 -0.144 (0.010) -0.155 (0.008) 
60 < size ≤ 70 -0.066 (0.008) -0.086 (0.006) 
1 room -0.463 (0.017) -0.500 (0.014) 
2 rooms -0.158 (0.013) -0.196 (0.011) 
3 rooms -0.112 (0.011) -0.115 (0.009) 
4 rooms  -0.042 (0.015) -0.048 (0.008) 
construction year ≤ 45 -0.042 (0.015) -0.093 (0.014) 
45 < constr. year ≤ 75 -0.039 (0.020) -0.131 (0.018) 
75 < constr. year ≤ 90 0.107 (0.018) 0.021 (0.017) 
single family dwelling 0.075 (0.009) 0.214 (0.008) 
neighbourhood controls  yes yes 
spatial correlation 0.508 0.563 
Note: Standard errors between brackets. The estimates are essentially the estimated coefficients of a regression 
analysis, allowing for correlation in the error terms. Correlation is accounted for using a random effects 
estimator, which allows the error terms of apartments that are located within the same building to be correlated. 
 
Our results rely on the assumption that the rent level and rental quality are both not 
correlated to any unobserved household characteristic. This seems a reasonable assumption 
particularly because rents are regulated. However, we emphasise that all apartment 
characteristics (e.g. number of rooms) included in the analysis are interpreted as control 
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variables for any unobserved household characteristic (e.g. number of children).11 In the 
sensitivity analysis, we particularly focus on this issue. 
Some households in our data receive a rent subsidy. We lack information about this 
subsidy. Rent subsidies are paid to households based on income and the rent paid, if 
households consume more housing than a minimal amount (Koning and Ridder, 1997). On 
average, the rent subsidy is about 14% of the rent. This suggests that the estimated effect of 
rent level is biased towards zero. This bias is likely negligible because the marginal effect of 
the rent subsidy on the exit rate is an order of magnitude smaller than the effect of the rent, 
because almost all households that receive a rent subsidy for their current apartment will 
receive about the same level of subsidy for other apartments offered to them. 12 
 
4.2 Empirical estimates 
4.2.1 Main results 
In Table 2, column (1), the estimated coefficients can be found. We focus on the effects of 
two determinants of residential mobility: the rent and rental quality (which are reported at the 
top of the table). In line with theoretical expectations, the effect of rent on residential mobility 
is positive, whereas higher rental quality reduces residential mobility.13 
Recall that rent is measured in logarithm, so the estimated coefficient of rent (4.390) 
can be interpreted as an elasticity. Hence, the results indicate a rent elasticity of about four to 
five. This result can be easily interpreted when it is realised that we control for the (residual 
                                               
11
 Apartment and household characteristics are strongly correlated to each other, also because housing 
associations match households to certain apartments. For example, households with (many) children 
usually occupy apartments with more rooms; ground floor apartments are occupied by the elderly etc. 
12
 If we assume, for example, that the (awarding of the) subsidy is household-specific, but the level of 
subsidy is apartment-specific and proportional to the rent (consistent with the institutional setting), 
then the bias in the effect of the logarithm of rent is zero, because log(net rent) = log(rent-subsidy) = 
log(rent-δrent) = log(1-δ)+log(rent), where 0 < δ < 1. Hence, the logarithm of the net rent is equal to 
the logarithm of the rent plus a (negative) constant. Hence, it is likely that the marginal effect of rent 
subsidy on residential mobility for the current apartment – and therefore any bias in the effect of the 
rent – is close to zero. 
13
 We do not discuss the results for the control variables, which are plausible and in line with the 
residential mobility literature. 
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of) property price, and that the ratio of rent to property price essentially varies between 
0.0033 and 0.0055 (with a median of 0.0043). The estimates imply then that an increase in 
rent over it's relevant interval increases the residential mobility rate by a factor of about two, 
which seems quite plausible. This finding supports the assumption of empirical studies which 
claim that the effect of rents on residential mobility is finite, so monopsonistic power is an 
important element for private suppliers (see Gibbons and Manning, 2006). The results 
indicate that the exit rates of low-quality and high-quality apartments differ by about 70%, 
suggesting that quality is a key indicator for households. 
Based on the estimates presented in Table 2 and equation (2), we are able to calculate 
the willingness to pay for rental quality. The results indicate that households are willing to 
pay a rent increase equivalent to an increase of 8.0% (calculated as 0.352/4.390) to move 
from a low-quality apartment to an average-quality one. The standard error is 2.1%, which is 
estimated using the delta method (e.g., Goldberger, 1991). Furthermore, they are willing to 
pay a rent increase equal to 7.3% to move from an average-quality to a high-quality 
apartment. The difference in the willingness to pay for a high-quality and low-quality 
apartment is therefore 15.3% (with a standard error of 3.1%). This difference amounts to 
about € 602 per year.14 A hedonic property price analysis indicates that the costs between 
high-quality and low-quality apartments is 13.1% (see column (2) of Table 3, because 
0.103+0.028 = 0.131), which is close to the households' willingness to pay for this quality 
difference. Importantly, this strongly suggest that the market outcome for rental quality is 
rather efficient when apartments are supplied by non-profit of associations, in contrast to 
earlier studies for private suppliers, which seems to provide an economic rationale for the 
existence of non-profit associations when rents are controlled (see Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) 
who provide other rationales). 
                                               
14
 One may also determine the households' monetary value of other indicators such as lifts. The results 
presented in Table 2 indicate that the monetary value households attached to a lift is 12.4% of the rent 
((0.352+0.195)/4.390), about € 495 per year, which seems a reasonable result. 
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In a perfectly-competitive rental market, rents reflect the willingness to pay for 
apartment characteristics. This is, of course, not the case in a regulated rent-controlled 
environment. However, in a regulated environment, a hedonic rent analysis is still useful, as it 
shows the relationship between households' rental expenditure and the apartment 
characteristics enjoyed by the households. A hedonic rent analysis (see column (1) of Table 3) 
shows that the corresponding rent decrease associated with low-quality housing is 7.9% of the 
rent, which is identical to the willingness to pay of 7.9%, estimated using the residential 
mobility model, so the rent exactly reflects the value that households attached to rental 
quality. However, the rent difference between high-quality and low-quality is 21%, whereas 
the difference in the households' willingness to pay is only 15%, so households consume of 
their demand curve. Given a quasi-linear utility function where the demand for quality does 
not depend on income, the market outcome will then be optimal, otherwise the market may be 
distorted through income effects. 
 
4.2.2 Sensitivity analyses 
As emphasised above, we have examined to what extent it is important to control for 
household characteristics. This is relevant, because we include few, but main, household 
characteristics, so as a minimum one must know whether controlling for household 
characteristics is essential. The results show that controlling, or not controlling for household 
characteristics, does not affect the results (see column (2) of Table 2).15 Furthermore, as can 
be seen from the first column of Table 2, household characteristics have no statistically-
significant effect on residential mobility when controlling for apartment characteristics. This 
is in line with the literature, which usually shows that household characteristics - except for 
                                               
15
 In a separate analysis not shown here, we have analysed the elapsed residence duration of new 
tenants (540 observations). For this subsample, we observe a large number of household 
characteristics. This analysis can be interpreted as an  analysis of residential moving given stationarity 
assumptions (Van den Berg, 1992). We find that household characteristics such as income and number 
of children have no effect on the elapsed duration when controlling for apartment characteristics. This 
also suggests that our approach, to use apartment characteristics as control factors, is sufficient to 
control for unobserved household characteristics. 
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age, for which we control, and the presence of children, for which we do not control - have 
limited explanatory power of residential mobility (Henley, 1998). This result makes particular 
sense in the context of regulated markets, as we have seen that occupants in regulated housing 
markets are much more homogeneous (in terms of income, age) than the population as a 
whole.  
Another way to examine the sensitivity regarding the inclusion of controls for the 
presence of children, which we do not observe in our data and which is likely the most 
relevant explanatory variable we do not control for, is to segment the analysis based on age. 
This is useful because only a very small proportion of elderly households still have children at 
home (in the Netherlands, most children have left their parents house before they are 25 years 
old). We have therefore estimated the same model for two subsamples based on age: older 
households (55+) and younger households (55-). Again we find that the results remain robust. 
So, controlling for children is not relevant in the current context where we are interested in 
the effect of apartment quality. 
We find also a similar robust result using subsamples for households with below-
average or above-average residence durations. Because residence duration is a good indicator 
of the arrival rate of new residences (as there is a queueing system in Rotterdam based on the 
residence duration), it suggests that our results are robust with respect to the residence arrival 
rate. As shortly explained at the end of section 3.1, we have also estimated a negative 
binomial model where we allow the moving rate to be correlated within buildings. The 
correlation effect is captured by a parameter α (building). The results are reported in the last 
column of Table 2. Again, we find that the results are robust.  
Studies such as Bajari and Benkard (2005) emphasise that it is important to take 
heterogeneity of consumers into account. Equation (1) does not impose a homogeneous 
households’ assumption, but the estimation procedure based on equation (2) restricts the 
coefficients β to be identical for all households, implicitly imposing a homogeneity 
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assumption. We have relaxed this assumption by allowing for random heterogeneity in 
coefficients of households occupying different buildings. In random coefficient models, one 
must restrict the number of random coefficients for computational reasons. We therefore 
allow only the two coefficients of main interest to become random. In all models, the 
estimated heterogeneity of the coefficient for rent is small relative to the mean effect, so 
heterogeneity in the rent coefficient can be ignored. The coefficient for rental quality appears 
to have some random variation, but the results remain essentially unaltered. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have introduced, and applied, a dynamic search methodology to estimate the household's 
monetary value of the quality of apartments in the public housing sector. In this sector, rents 
are controlled, and apartments are supplied by non-profit housing associations rather than by 
private suppliers. Our main interest is to determine the household's willingness to pay for 
quality in the public housing sector, which has received much attention for the private 
housing sector, and to compare this measure with measures of the effect of quality on costs 
and rents. Our methodology to derive household's monetary value of the quality of the 
apartment is based on household's residential mobility and generates plausible results. Our 
estimates demonstrate that the households' monetary value of rental quality is about 15% of 
the rent level.  
One of the main, and surprising, implications of our results is that the households' 
monetary value attached to quality of their apartments is about equal to the costs of providing 
quality, suggesting efficiency regarding provision of rental quality by housing associations in 
the public housing sector. This does not imply however that rental quality is priced as in a 
private market. Our results allow for the possibility that the household's price of quality 
exceeds its costs. 
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Our results also do not imply that residential characteristics other than quality are also 
offered in line with households preferences. In particular if the controlled rent is not tied to 
certain characteristics (as is the case for residential location in the Netherlands), it is plausible 
that the market outcome for these characteristics is strongly distorted by rental control. 
  Our explanation for the apparent efficiency of the market outcome for apartment 
quality is that housing associations are non-profit organisations which have an incentive to 
supply quality in line with households' preferences. This suggests that the difference between 
non-profit organisations and profit organisations is essential in markets with rent control and 
that non-profit organisations may reduce some of the market distortions induced by rent 
control. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Descriptives. 
Continuous variables Mean S.D. 
rent level (euro per month) 374 87 
rent level (in log) 5.896 0.239 
Property price (in euro) 116,000 29,900 
Property price (in log) 11.624 0.268 
age of household head (years) 55.363 16.811 
log residence duration 4.302 1.129 
   
Dummy variables   
low quality 0.058  
high quality 0.073  
apartment without lift (no gr. fl.) 0.233  
apartment with lift (no gr. fl.) 0.414  
size ≤ 50 0.191  
50 < size ≤ 60 0.264  
60 < size ≤ 70 0.380  
high income 0.009  
1 room 0.018  
2 rooms 0.147  
3 rooms 0.403  
4 rooms  0.282  
Construction year ≤ 45 0.201  
45 < constr. year ≤ 75 0.365  
75 < constr. year ≤ 90 0.383  
single family dwelling 0.215  
 
